Roula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.
Whatever Stephen Miller or Bill Ackman might say, it was the bond market that beat the Trump administration into an abrupt “PAUSE” for tariff negotiations.
The S&P 500 had nearly fallen into a bear market, but just two days of Treasuries puking was enough to force a rethink. The NYT has a good inside account of how much it swayed him. As Trump himself admitted:
I was watching the bond market. The bond market is very tricky, I was watching it. But if you look at it now it’s beautiful. The bond market right now is beautiful . . . I saw last night where people were getting a little queasy.
The bond market is hardly “beautiful” again. It’s notable that while stonks did stonksy things after president Trump backed down, the bond market has been much more circumspect. The 10-year Treasury yield actually rose again yesterday, and while it’s dipped a little today it is still at 4.32 per cent at pixel time, and well above the 3.86 per cent low touched less than a week ago.
But just how queasy did it get? Happily, JPMorgan’s rates analysts have published a report that looks across the Treasury market ecosystem, and the overall takeaway is that the Treasury market felt pretty sick, but not nearly as badly as it did in March 2020.
First of all, it definitely was an unusually turbulent week for Treasuries, and yields became completely unanchored from what the fundamentals would suggest.
Treasuries markedly underperformed other high-grade sovereign bond markets (oh, UK) and the depth of the market — as measured by the sum of the three best bids and offers across the Treasury curve — atrophied sharply.
However, as you can see from right-hand chart there, the Treasury market’s depth didn’t evaporate as dramatically as it did in March 2020, nor reach a similar low.
Yesterday the duration-weighted market depth across the Treasury curve reached a low of $67mn. That’s worst since the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank in early 2023 — and not great in a market that is supposed to be the most liquid in the world — but it is still better than the $38mn nadir of March 2020.
Moreover, JPMorgan’s analysts note that other measures of dislocations and distress were far less extreme. For example, while stale “off-the-run” Treasuries became less liquid and gapped out, it was nothing like what we saw in March 2020, and there didn’t seem to be any run to the liquidity of fresher “on-the-run” Treasuries.
What about the by-now infamous Treasury basis trade that Alphaville and others initially blamed for much of the turbulence?
JPMorgan says this is understandable — given the size and leverage involved — but it turns out that there aren’t that any signs of severe dislocations in various Treasury futures and their “cheapest-to-deliver” bonds, which is what you’d expect to see if there had been a disorderly unwind of basis trades:
While these are reasonable fears in deleveraging episodes, a close examination of Treasury futures bases show little signs of stress, and suggest that this is one corner of the broader market that is weathering the crisis very well so far.
Here’s a rundown of the gross and net basis across various Treasury futures, open interest in the contracts, implied repo rates and so on (zoomable version of the chart):
In other words, there probably were some Treasury basis trades being unwound, and simply given the size of the strategy this could have contributed quite a bit to the sell-off. Alphaville also gathers that things were starting to “crack” on Wednesday, so this could easily have become a bigger factor had Trump not bent the knee. But on the whole it was a fairly orderly basis trade retrenchment, and nothing like the chaotic unravelling that we saw in March 2020.
Similarly, JPMorgan says that wholesale funding markets — like commercial paper and repo — were volatile but remained orderly.
On the other hand, things were definitely not orderly in swaps. Or as JPMorgan puts it in understated sellsidese: “Moves in swap spreads have been nothing short of dramatic this week.”
On the face if it, this strongly implies that the swaps spread trade really was the biggest culprit in this latest bout of Treasury market turbulence.
Alphaville hasn’t been able to get even a rough estimate for how much money was betting on swap spreads normalising. The basis trade could still be the bigger contributor to the turmoil in Treasuries even though it was relatively less whiplashed, simply because of its size. But for now we can perhaps consider April 2025 primarily a Swapsmageddon [ed: Aswapscalypse, surely?] rather than a Basisclysm.
Anyway, all these trades are really part of the same elephant: interest rates arbitrage that rely on wholesale funding for massive amounts of leverage. And in an ideal world the US Treasury market wouldn’t be this susceptible to breakage.
Further reading: — The trades threatening the Treasury market (FTAV)
Roula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.
Dear Bond Vigilantes,
As a great man once said: “I owe you an apology. I wasn’t really familiar with your game.”
Things were looking very dicey for Americans, after the White House introduced an aggressive and bafflingly calculated set of tariffs on basically all of its trading partners. Stocks were down, Treasury yields were up (prices down), and the dollar was down, too. None of that is good!
And last night, long-dated Treasuries started selling off. Hard. By the morning, market participants were talking about emergency Fed interventions. And while a cut seemed like a stretch, investors were looking out for pain in funding markets, which may have required liquidity interventions.
But you know all of this, my wise newfound friends. You were there! We think. Probably.
In the past, we’ve expressed scepticism that government spending and/or social programs would really unleash your full power against the US state. First, the name makes you sound like a bogeyman. Second, it’s a lot easier to threaten countries without reserve currency status. Third, the famous James Carville quote about how you scare everybody has become annoying. And finally, policymakers shouldn’t be too responsive to threats about you, because those threats are often used to stop government investment and spending, which aren’t inherently bad things!
Things have changed. Back then we didn’t know that the US executive branch would be willing to try an American version of Brexit, but even dumber and more harmful to the global economy. If anyone could achieve that, it would be America, but we’ll admit we lacked the necessary policy imagination to see it.
Our dear vigilantes, you knew that Americans are not actually ready for factory life, despite the arguments of hundreds of sad and embittered young men online. And you stepped into the breach between the US and its Big Beautiful Leap Onshoreward.
Do you really exist? Are you really a shadowy cabal of global investors that punishes governments for bad ideas? Well, that’s unclear.
But President Donald Trump told the press today he was watching the bond market last night, much like the rest of us, after saying he had noticed that people “were getting yippy.”
So, as far as we’re concerned, you contributed to his decision to follow through with the 90-day pause that was mysteriously first reported on Monday.
This isn’t to say that the US is saved, because LOL, it is not. Who knows what fresh horrors await tomorrow and next week. That may be why Treasuries are still selling off, though the dollar seems to have at least halted its decline.
There are still questions. For example: Is Europe included on the roster of non-retaliating economies, even though it approved additional tariffs just this morning? Why did it briefly sound like we put a 35% tariff on Mexico and Canada, and a 10% tariff on USMCA-compliant goods? CNBC is reporting that we haven’t. Still confusing.
For now, though, it feels like a fast-moving disaster has become a slow-moving disaster. Maybe we can get some sleep and go outside with our kids this evening. And if you listen to the President’s comments, it sounds like you’re part of the reason for that.
Simply sign up to the UK employment myFT Digest — delivered directly to your inbox.
If we’ve been struggling to sleep for the past few weeks, it’s probably because of this MainFT story from 25 March:
An unnamed large employer’s late supply of earnings information to the UK statistics agency risks skewing the country’s main official measure of wage growth, raising doubts about data that guides monetary policy.
The intervening period has seen a surge in global market instability, no doubt due to traders’ uncertainty about who the mystery business upsetting the UK’s average weekly earnings could be, and what impact the revisions might have:
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Despite these ructions, we didn’t see much sell-side speculation. Bruna Skarica from Morgan Stanley was one of the few to put her head above the parapet, writing last week:
It is hard to think of a single business which could move the numbers meaningfully, barring perhaps NHS England. Should revisions pertain to the NHS, they would show up in public sector and whole economy data.
Well, we have a new load of labour market data, and something of an answer.
And no, it’s not NHS England. Instead, it’s a major retailer. Or an exceptionally large repair company.
The ONS, naturally, is tight-lipped about the identity of this “one business”, and declined to offer more details to FT Alphaville. Can the data offer a clue?
Quoth the ONS:
As noted in the previous bulletin, we were working, as an exception, on opening up revisions further back in time than usual to allow for late and updated returns we received from one business to be included. We have now concluded this work and, as part of this release, we have revised the estimates back to October 2020 to improve the quality of our estimates.…
At the whole economy level, the revisions are generally small and within the range we see during seasonal adjustment reviews. As expected, as the estimates are broken down below the whole economy level, the revisions become larger. The largest revisions are seen in the wholesaling, retailing, hotels and restaurants sector and the retail trade and repairs industry, which warranted the exceptional revisions to be implemented.
They add, channelling Morrissey:
Some periods see bigger revisions than others.
Despite this, the ONS seems a bit shy to show just how acute those revisions are. The section of today’s AWE release covering the adjustments includes a whole economy view…
…a private-sector view…
…and a wholesaling, retailing, hotels and restaurants sector view…
…but pulls up just short of giving us a chart for the most granular (and therefore juicy) level, instead supplying only words:
The retail trade and repairs industry showed the largest revisions. The largest revisions were for the periods between the three months to November 2021 to May 2022, when the revisions were between 1.5 to 3.4 percentage points and more recently from the three months to July 2024 to September 2024, when they were around 2.1 percentage points.
To get our chart on, we had to go to X04: Average Weekly Earnings Supplementary Analysis, a spreadsheet released alongside today’s release. That spreadsheet has specific monthly AWE figures for before and after the revisions. Here’s how they looks (NB unlike the other charts above, these figures are not seasonally adjusted):
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It’s a pretty big jump once we get down to this level. May 2024 is particularly notable — retail and repair AWE that week were 28.7 per cent higher than the ONS previously thought.
The gap, as you might guess from the shape of the line above the pink line above, appears to be in large part down to a one-off bonus: the ONS’s revisions put retail and repairs AWE £19 higher than month, and ascribe £17 of that jump to bonuses:
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So, what do we know?
— one business — retail or repair — above-average pay (given it pulled up the whole series) — big, like shift-the-whole-series big — paid out a substantial bonus in May 2024
And since we’re a blog, we can idly speculate.
Last April, the UK’s supermarket, Tesco — one of the UK’s biggest private-sector employers — announced a £70mn bonus scheme for its 220,000 staff.
According to a post on the Tesco subreddit, this took the form of a “one-off payment of 1.5% of eligible earnings for hourly staff in UK stores, CFCs, UFCs, CEC and distribution”, that landed in Tesco employees’ May pay packet.
So if we had to bet, it’d be Tesco. If you have a better guess, let us know in the usual ways.
Roula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.
Hahahahaha OK then!!!!
For the next 90 days, the US will impose 10-per-cent universal tariffs instead of the “reciprocal” tariffs announced by the White House last week. At least for countries that haven’t retaliated.
China is an especially glaring exception. President Trump announced the pause at the very end of a Truth Social post that was supposedly focused on an increase in tariffs against China to 125-per-cent. That post came less than four hours after President Trump posted that it was “a good time to buy”. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
In the 90-day pause period, it seems that the US president wants to simply Do Deals with every country in the world. In the interim, the US is imposing an additional universal 10-per-cent tariff, as Treasury secretary Scott Bessent said in a press conference, adding that US officials have a meeting with Vietnam today.
One important issue here: Bessent didn’t answer a reporter’s shouted question about the EU, which voted to approve additional tariffs against the US this morning.
Anyway, the stonks are stonking. The S&P 500 was up almost 8 per cent around 2pm in New York:
And the Nasdaq Composite was ripping, up 9.5 per cent, despite the fact that the back-and-forth tariff fight with China is ongoing.
Most importantly, the shockingly quick Treasury-curve steepener trade we saw over the past few days is reversing itself.
To explain: Treasuries maturing in two years (and less) are more closely linked to near-to-medium-term Federal Reserve policy decisions. Yields have been falling since February, as traders price rising risk of recession and at least Fed “insurance” cuts. Earlier today, the bond market carnage was so severe they were even pricing in the possibility of emergency monetary easing.
On the other hand, the value of longer-dated Treasuries are more dependent on inflation (to simplify, a bond’s principal repayment is worth even less in 30 years if inflation is high).
So the fact that the two-year Treasury yield has soared the most — an eye-popping 30 basis points to the 10-year yield’s ~15 basis points — seems to imply that the near-term doomsday scenario is less of a risk, in markets’ view.
So Great Depression 2 is off, we guess? For now.
But hey! It looks like that Walter Bloomberg has been vindicated. Same goes for the bank trading desks that were circulating the headlines before he did on Monday.
Roula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.
In the scramble to figure out how exactly “Liberation Day” is going to upend global trade, nuclear errors may occur.
Economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond released a great chart (covered in mainFT) identifying the sectors that will be most impacted by Trump’s sweeping trade levies.
The first four — leather goods, apparel, furniture, and textile product mills — made a lot of sense. These industries all import heavily from the countries facing the steepest tariffs, like Vietnam, China and Cambodia.
But the fifth item prompted a bit more head-scratching. And when the Richmond Fed kindly provided the underlying data for the chart, they also supplied a clarification for the ages.
PS: we had a typo in one of the industries, instead of “Nuclear Warheads” it should have been “Support Activities for agriculture and forestry.”
You might be wondering how “nuclear warheads” ended up in place of “support activities for agriculture and forestry.” And if you’re developing conspiracy theories about the cover-up of nuke inflation, we’re afraid we must let you down: it seems it really was a typo.
The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code for “support activities for agriculture and forestry” is 115. The Product Service Code (PSC) code for “nuclear warheads and warhead sections” is 1115.
As fat-finger errors involving nuclear warheads go, it’s probably one of the better ones.
Feeling a little more relaxed, FT Alphaville started asking the obvious question: what on earth are “support activities for agriculture and forestry”?
Well, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Industries in the Support Activities for Agriculture and Forestry subsector provide support services that are an essential part of agricultural and forestry production.”
So that’s that all cleared up.
The chart on the Richmond Fed’s website has now been “updated to accurately reflect the proper industries” and the original work has been lost to history. Here’s the disarmed version:
There’s a lot going on in the Treasury market right now, and none of it is good. “Liberation day” seems to have morphed into “liquidation day”.
You might have seen terms like “off the runs”, “basis trades”, “swap spreads” and “omg are we going to die” bandied about over the past few days (including here on Alphaville) and been a little baffled.
We realise that not everyone is quite the fixed income dorks that we are, so here’s an explainer of some of the more common “relative-value” strategies that hedge funds often pursue in the bond market.
This is not the really funky stuff. These are actually fairly plain-vanilla trades that have in some form been around for decades. But quite a few of them were supercharged in the post-crisis era — thanks to the regulation-enforced retreat of banks and the rise of leaner algorithmic market-makers — and all have the potential to blow up rarely but spectacularly (viz LTCM).
If you’re a diligent Alphaville reader then some of this might seem familiar, as we’ve in some places repurposed or adapted previous material from older posts. But we thought it might make sense to gather all this stuff in one simple (ish) explainer, and rewriting everything from scratch felt redundant. As always, let us know in the comments if we’ve gotten something wrong in the process of simplifying things.
Treasury basis trades
This is the one that is most often talked about, as it is one of the longest-established fixed income relative-value trades around — dating at least back to 1979, when Salomon Brothers’ John Meriwether lifted one version out of EF Eckstein, one of the first Treasury futures brokers.
Treasury futures typically trade at a premium to the government bond you can deliver to satisfy the derivatives contract. That’s mostly because they are a convenient way for investors to gain leveraged exposure to Treasuries (you only have to put down an initial margin for the nominal exposure you’re buying). Asset managers are as a result mostly net long Treasury futures.
However this premium opens up an opportunity for hedge funds to take the other side. They sell Treasury futures and buy Treasury bonds to hedge themselves, capturing an almost risk-free spread of a few basis points. Normally, hedge fund managers don’t get out of bed for a few measly bps, but because Treasuries are so solid you can leverage the trade many, many times.
Let’s say you put down $10mn for Treasuries and sell an equal value of futures. You can then use the Treasuries as collateral for, say, $9.9mn of short-term loans in the repo market. Then you buy another $9.9mn of Treasuries, sell an equivalent amount of Treasury futures, and the repeat the process again and again and again.
It’s hard to get firm idea of what is the typical amount of leverage that hedge funds use for Treasury basis trades, but Alphaville gathers that as much as 50 times is normal and up to 100 times can happen. In other words, just $10mn of capital can support as much as $1bn of Treasury purchases.
Here’s a good schematic showing how it all works, from a previous big read on the subject:
And how significant is the trade in aggregate? Well, it’s an imperfect measure for a lot of reasons, but the best proxy for its overall size is the net short Treasury futures positioning of hedge funds, which currently stands at about $800bn, with asset managers the mirror image on the long side.
The problem is that both Treasury futures and repo markets demand much more collateral when there is an unusual amount of volatility in the Treasury market. And if the hedge fund can’t pony up then lenders can seize the collateral — Treasury bonds — and sell them into the market. As a result, it is a major danger lurking inside the market that is supposed to be the financial system’s equivalent of a bomb shelter.
We saw this most memorably in March 2020, when it took almost $1tn of Treasury-purchases by the Federal Reserve to prevent the US government bond market from exploding. We are not nearly there right now, but there’s been a similar “doom loop” of margin calls, liquidation and falling prices in recent days.
Off-the-run trades
Another famous Treasury trade also popularised by LTCM takes advantage of how investors in the US government bond market usually pay a premium for the most recently-issued Treasury bond.
That’s because the freshly-minted Treasury — which is called the “on-the-run” security — is the most liquid. After a few weeks or months of issuance, it tends to settle into accounts at insurance companies, banks or pension plans, where it doesn’t trade as much. It becomes an “off-the-run” Treasury bond.
But inevitably, all on-the-run Treasuries become off-the-run Treasuries eventually, so the price difference can be exploited by hedge funds. They short the freshest Treasury bonds and go long the nearest off-the-run one, which might just be a few months older.
Once a new on-the-run bond emerges, the prices between the two securities should converge. Sometimes we’re talking only a couple of basis points of difference between two very similar Treasuries, but here’s a chart showing the yield difference between Treasuries maturing in nine and 10 years to make it clearer.
As you can see, it can be as low as zero, is usually around 4-5 basis points and has now shot up to nearly 9 basis points (and at the time of writing, US trading hasn’t really gotten under way yet).
Like Treasury basis trades, this only works with enormous dollops of leverage. And because both legs of the trade are supersafe US Treasuries (only the maturity is a little different), prime brokerages at banks will allow a lot of it, just as they do with Treasury basis trades.
Of course, just because the spreads should narrow over time doesn’t mean that they always do. In both LTCM’s 1998 death and in March 2020 the spread between off and on the run securities also ballooned dramatically, as the violence of the volatility forced hedge funds to unwind the trade.
As the Federal Reserve’s minutes from March 15, 2020 noted:
In the Treasury market, following several consecutive days of deteriorating conditions, market participants reported an acute decline in market liquidity. A number of primary dealers found it especially difficult to make markets in off-the-run Treasury securities and reported that this segment of the market had ceased to function effectively.
Again, we’re not seeing anywhere near this turbulence right now, but off-the-run spreads have widened, implying that this could be another contributing factor to the Treasury market sell-off.
Swap spread trades
This is a newer culprit, and one that Alphaville initially discounted as a smaller contributor than the basis trade being unwound. But from our conversations it seems it could actually have been the biggest one so far.
Because of various bits of post-financial crisis regulation, US banks are constrained in how many Treasuries they can hold. Meanwhile, cleared interest rate swaps are less capital-intensive, which has led to swap spreads — the difference between the fixed rate bit of an interest rate swap and the comparable government bond yield — to mostly stay in negative territory for many years.
It has been especially prevalent for longer term swaps. In practice, the negative swap spreads simply reflected the rising cost of storing stuff on banks’ balance sheets. As the Bank for International Settlements said in a report last year:
Negative spreads compensate intermediaries for holding government bonds on their balance sheets and entering swaps as fixed rate payers. Both swap and bond markets are intermediated by bank-affiliated dealers who require remuneration for using their balance sheets and taking on associated risks. When dealers absorb a large amount of bonds, they incur funding costs in the repo market for financing the long bond position.
Additionally, they tend to hedge the interest rate risk by paying the fixed swap rate and receiving the floating rate. When doing so, dealers also need to factor in balance sheet costs from internal risk management and prudential rules, as well as opportunity costs of other uses of their balance sheet capacity.
If these costs are high enough, dealers will recoup them through a negative swap spread. Moreover, if dealer balance sheets are constrained, non-bank players such as hedge funds may need to be incentivised to step in, deploying repo leverage to assume similar positions as dealers.
However, at the start of the year, a lot of people were getting excited by the prospect of the new Trump administration unwinding a lot of the post-crisis regulatory edifice.
And that raised the prospect of negative swap rates suddenly evaporating, as banks would be freed up to hold more Treasuries themselves, or simply have much more balance sheet space to finance hedge funds that wanted to arbitrage the spread.
In February, Barclays estimated that the scrapping of the “supplementary leverage ratio” alone could create about $6tn of “leverage exposure capacity”, which would in particular help Treasuries. As a result, hedge funds earlier this year went long Treasuries and short swaps in the expectation that the spread would flip from being deeply negative to closer to zero.
However the convergence trade only works with lots of leverage (you might have detected a theme here). And the recent volatility has ratcheted up margin requirements across the board, unravelling many of these trades.
That has in turn made the swap spread even more negative, and led to new round of margin calls, even more negative swap spreads, and so on.
OK OK that’s enough. So what does it all mean?
Well, that Treasury market volatility triggered by the Trump administration’s new tariff regime has now sparked a technical unwind of billions of dollars of highly leveraged hedge fund trades — a bit like how Liz Truss’s badly-judged budget plans triggered a meltdown of LDI strategies in the gilt market.
All these trades are in their basic form pretty safe, and arguably a service to financial markets, by helping support Treasury markets and ensuring that all the different parts of the wider rates ecosystem is tied together. It’s the level and fickleness of the leverage that can make them dangerous occasionally.
Normally these things burn themselves out soon enough, but there are rising expectations that the Federal Reserve may have to step in to prevent the Treasury sell-off from becoming disorderly and destructive. In other words, not per se to keep yields low, but to ensure that there are no major financial mishaps.
However, at some point we really should stop and think about whether we want the US Treasury market to be so vulnerable to these kinds of situations that it requires central bank intervention again and again?
Roula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.
Life comes at you fast. From this morning’s Bank of England Financial Policy Committee report:
US equities and the value of the US dollar had declined in Q1 as some investors reduced US dollar asset positioning. And following the US announcement on trade tariffs on 2 April, the prices of global equities, risky corporate credit, and commodities fell sharply. Market interest rates also fell and yield curves steepened. Market volatility rose significantly and the US dollar depreciated. Market functioning, in the light of exceptionally high volumes, has remained orderly. Notwithstanding these falls in asset prices, the risk of further sharp corrections remains high.
That landed in our inbox at 10:30am. And here’s the yield on UK 30-year gilts at shortly before pixel time:
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30 yrs are obviously particularly important and interesting because the UK issues a lot of them, in part because of their popularity among insurers and pensions funds using Liability-Driven Investment strategies. You can read more about that from Toby here.
They’re also, infamously, the asset class that got most blown up the in the mini-Budget aftermath. So how much trouble are they in?
Well, they’re moving more than their peers in other markets, which is never a good start. Plus. today has seen the biggest move since the aftermath of Liz Truss’s mini-Budget in 2022 (more on that here). Which, tbf remains a pretty steep wall to climb:
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What’s happening? Well, the obvious answer is that US Treasuries are up, so gilts basically have to move too. Again, read your Toby.
There’s also a possibility that the UK will have to cobble together some kind of fiscal response to Donald Trump’s tariff shock, which would involve more borrowing and more price pressure on gilts.
But that doesn’t explain why 30 yrs are specifically getting hit so hard. As TD Securities’ Pooja Kumra writes of this “glaring move”:
On every metric, 30y Gilts are cheap: 30y Gilts vs. UST/Bunds, 30y UK ASWs or 5s30s curve, the move has been striking. Key risk for trade remains illiquidity due to which we keep a wider stop.
She notes:
— Sell-off in long-end seems similar to move seen March 2020. Trigger was global funds liquidating all non-USD holdings as a move to rush to cash. Tracking our fund flows, long-end Gilts have been the key beneficiary of these flows. EPFR flows are still muted in Bunds and so there is less liquidation move.
— Growing presence of leveraged players in Gilt cash and repo market. A key risk flagged by the BoE members.
Once again, all simply roads may lead to Threadneedle Street. Markets are now pricing in far more Bank of England rate cuts, but this type of action might force the Monetary Policy Committee could move more quickly, Kumra suggests:
Markets should not underestimate a possible easing in the form of regulations or verbal easing or even temp QT freeze on this move.
We’ve said it before: it’s Andrew Bailey’s world, we just live in it.
Further reading: — Where the Bank of England’s QE programme went wrong
